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Abstract
Understanding why many people spontaneously perform pro-en-
vironmental behaviours, rather than requiring some incentive, is an
active area of research. To solve the puzzle, many studies address
people’s intrinsic motivation for this kind of behaviour. However,
the term ‘intrinsic’ remains unclear, and thus also the solution of
the puzzle. We contribute to this research by attaching intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation to the pursuit of central goals in people’s lives.
We take the prominent example of the motivations in looking for a
job, and relate these motivations to pro-environmental attitudes and
engagements. Using an international sample, we find that intrinsic
motivation relates positively and extrinsic motivation relates negat-
ively to a variety of subjective pro-environmental outcomes. This
result holds for different sub-samples and for various econometric spe-
cifications and methodologies. In particular, two-stage least squares
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estimation with proper instruments provides evidence of a causal re-
lationship between motivations and pro-environmental outcomes.
JEL codes: Q5; D91; Q53
Keywords: intrinsic motivation; extrinsic motivation; pro-environ-
mental behaviours; multilevel model; instrumental variables; World
Values Survey; European Values Study
1 Introduction
The reason why many people spontaneously perform pro-environmental be-
haviours, rather than requiring some material incentive, is still not well un-
derstood. Arguing that people’s intrinsic motivation is the underlying reason
only moves the mystery one step further, because the term ‘intrinsic’ remains
unclear (Lindenberg, 2001; Van der Werff et al., 2013). It originally referred
to “the inherent satisfactions of the behaviors per se” (Deci and Ryan, 2002),
but this is counter-intuitive in the case of pro-environmental behaviours, be-
cause such behaviours are usually costly (Blankenberg and Alhusen, 2018).
Other interpretations thus attach ‘intrinsic motivation’ to gaining reputa-
tion for pro-environmental competence and moral obligation. But in this
way, extrinsic motivation could come into play, because social recognition
could become an external incentive for pro-environmental behaviors. This
paper contributes to solving the puzzle by attaching ‘intrinsic motivation’
to the pursuit of personal life goals. To be concrete, we will refer intrinsic
motivation to a specific life domain, i.e. work. Leveraging on integrated
World Values Survey - European Values Study (WVS/EVS) data, we exploit
the answers to what people look for in a job to distinguish ‘intrinsic’ goals,
like community feeling and personal accomplishment, from ‘extrinsic’ goals,
like a good income and a safe job. Our approach is justified by the literat-
ure showing that motivation on the job is positively correlated with overall
subjective well-being, while extrinsic motivation on the job is negatively cor-
related (Salinas-Jiménez et al., 2010; Meier and Stutzer, 2008).
We expect personal life goals, such as work-related goals, to inform how
people approach the environmental problem. More precisely, we expect
people with intrinsic goals, and thus with the underlying intrinsic motiv-
ation, to exhibit more pro-environmental behaviours than people with ex-
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trinsic motivation and goals. We expect this prediction to be valid in a
variety of contexts and pro-environmental outcomes.
The WVS/EVS provides us data on a number of subjective pro-environ-
mental outcomes, which can be distinguished between attitudes and engage-
ments in behaviours of the respondents. The international samples used will
differ according to the availability of the data on the pro-environmental out-
comes, and according to greater homogeneity of work status, i.e. employed
only, or countries, i.e. OECD countries. The methodologies used are first the
probit and order probit estimations with the usual socio-demographic con-
trols. Then we proceed with multilevel regression analysis in order to control
for country specific features, like GDP per capita and two indices for hu-
man and social capitals. We finally test for causality by using the two-stage
least squares estimation and proper instruments for the motivations. This is
perhaps the largest econometric analysis in the literature on the relationship
between life goals and pro-environmental behaviours.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. By reviewing the relevant
literature, Section 2 distinguishes the different interpretations of intrinsic
(and extrinsic) motivation related to pro-environmental behaviours. Sections
3 and 4 present the data and, respectively, the methodologies used in the
estimations. Section 5 and 6 show the results with a special focus on the
endogeneity issue. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the literature
Financial incentives to steer Pro-Environmental Behaviours (PEB) can be
effective, but have a number of drawbacks: they are costly; they may increase
illegal waste disposal; they may instill the idea of having the right to pollute;
they may discourage non-incentivized PEB (Kirakozian, 2016; Bolderdijk and
Steg, 2015). However, observations from the field and experiments from the
lab show that many individuals perform PEB spontaneously. This counters
the prediction of rational choice, because the marginal cost of individuals’
PEB is higher than the marginal benefit, as long as the natural environment
or its quality is a public good, so that no PEB should arise without incentives
(Sturm and Weimann, 2006).
A lot of literature has investigated why individuals spontaneously per-
form PEB, having recognised that some spontaneously perform more PEB
than others. A popular answer is that some individuals have ‘intrinsic mo-
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tivations’ to perform PEB, whereas others need incentives, thus revealing
‘extrinsic motivations’. But different studies put forward different concepts
of ‘in/extrinsic motivation’.
According to a stream of research in psychology, “intrinsically motivated
behaviours are those whose motivation is based in the inherent satisfactions
of the behaviors per se, [...] whereas extrinsic motivation is focused toward
and dependent on contingent outcomes that are separable from the action
per se” (Deci and Ryan, 2002, p. 10). This interpretation of intrinsic mo-
tivation has been sometimes called ‘hedonic’ (Lindenberg, 2001), and when
the emotional aspect of satisfaction is underlined it is called ‘warm glow giv-
ing’ by the economists (Andreoni, 1990). Intrinsically motivated individuals
choose to perform PEB because they expect to enjoy it, whereas extrinsic-
ally motivated individuals choose to perform PEB if they enjoy a sufficient
incentive for it. Indeed, a positive correlation between individuals’ PEB and
well-being emerges in many studies of psychologists and economists (Kasser,
2017; Welsch and Kühling, 2011).
However, the ‘hedonic’ interpretation of intrinsic motivation generally
refers to activities that involve interest, curiosity and play (Deci and Ryan,
2002), while PEB per se hardly arouse such feelings, maybe because PEB aim
at preserving well-known environmental conditions rather than discovering
something new. One would expect that managing waste at home, minimising
the use of home heating, water and electricity are not pleasurable per se
(Binder and Blankenberg, 2017).
A second interpretation of intrinsic motivation focuses on some individu-
als’ Pro-Environmental (PE) characteristics: people perform PEB in order
to exercise or show those characteristics. Individuals with PE characteristics
enjoy exercising or showing them, thus appearing as intrinsically motivated,
while individuals without those characteristics have no reason to exercise or
show them, and need incentives for PEB, thus appearing as extrinsically mo-
tivated. A variety of characteristics are investigated: PE competence, i.e.
the extent to which one maintains self-efficacy in performing PEB; PE self-
image, i.e. the extent to which one sees oneself as a type of person whose
actions are PE; PE obligation, i.e. the extent to which one follows PE norms
as socially learned; PE personal values, i.e. the extent to which one believes
in PE values (e.g., preventing pollution and protecting the environment).
These individuals’ characteristics attract, singly or in combination, signific-
ant positive correlation coefficients with PEB, as shown, e.g., in Tabernero
and Hernandez (2011) for PE competence, in Van der Werff et al. (2013) for
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PE self-image and PE obligation, and in Gatersleben et al. (2014) for PE
values.
However, exercising or showing these individual PE characteristics may
be induced by some need of social approval, i.e. need of appearing PE com-
petent, with a desirable PE self-image, with a civic morale and respectable
PE values. To such an extent, the implied motivation follows a contingent
outcome, i.e. it is extrinsic. As a consequence, if an external shock dampened
the social perception of the environmental problem, individual’s PEB would
be discouraged, and a source of well-being would dry up.
Furthermore, although the social norms that prescribe PEB can be ef-
fective in contributing to preserve the environment as a public good (Farrow
et al., 2017), they are vulnerable to ‘free-riding’. As studies on public good
games show, cooperative behaviour tends to decrease if the game is repeated.
To support cooperation, an additional motivation to utility derived from the
public good is needed (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Ostrom, 2000) .
A third interpretation of intrinsic motivation focuses on individuals’ life
goals, like personal growth, affiliation and community contribution, which
are proved by research in both psychology and economics as being associated
with individual’s well-being (Ryan et al., 2008; Ryff and Singer, 2008; Konow
and Earley, 2008; Bartolini et al., 2013; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014). These
goals can be said ‘intrinsic’ because they are pursued for their own sake, so
that also the motivations for such pursuit can be said ‘intrinsic’. By contrast,
‘extrinsic goals’, like wealth, social recognition, and image, are pursued in-
strumentally for some other goals, and they are negatively associated with
well-being (Ryan et al., 2008). The motivations for such pursuit can thus be
said ‘extrinsic’. Since PEB is consistent with the personal goal of community
contribution, its underlying motivation is intrinsic. By contrast, if individu-
als hold extrinsic goals, then they need a sufficient incentive, financial or in
the form of social approval, to perform PEB (Brown and Kasser, 2005).1
Such ‘life goals approach’ to intrinsic motivations for PEB is under-
researched (see the reviews by Blankenberg and Alhusen (2018); Tripathi
and Singh (2016)). Nevertheless, it avoids the problem of the ‘hedonic’ ap-
proach, because performing PEB can be unpleasant per se, but it can become
pleasant if it is involved in the pursuit of intrinsic life goals. This approach
1Many psychology studies focus on ‘materialism’ as an extrinsic value or goal (meaning
the tendency to judge one’s own success and that of others in terms of material posses-
sions), and find significant correlations with PEB (Hurst et al., 2013).
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also avoids the possible problem of the one based on individuals’ PE char-
acteristics, by keeping distinct final goals (being intrinsic) from instrumental
goals (being extrinsic). If an external shock, like an environmental policy,
mitigated the need for PEB, individuals’ intrinsic life goals hardly change,
thus remaining as the ultimate source of well-being.
3 Data
The integrated World Values Survey - European Values Study dataset con-
tains five questions that allow us to measure people’s pro-environmental at-
titudes and engagements (see Table 1 for the list of variables used in this
study and some descriptive statistics). People’s attitudes are observed via
respondent’s degree of agreement with the following statements:
• Would buy things at a 20% higher price if it would help protect the
environment;
• Increase in taxes if used to prevent environmental damage;
• Would give part of my income for the environment.
The answers to each of these items range on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to
4 (strongly disagree). For the purpose of present study, we revert the order
of these answers so that higher scores indicate stronger agreement.
The wording of the questions we use to observe people’s engagement in
pro-environmental behaviours2 is as follows: “Which, if any, of these things
have you done in the last 12 months, out of concern for the environment?
• Recycle;
• Reduce water consumption.
The possible answers are dichotomous: one if the respondent declared to
have done the specific action, zero otherwise.
Together, the five items about people’s pro-environmental attitudes and
behaviours allow us to test the role of motivations in a variety of settings,
using various wordings, and different contexts. Indeed, as reported in the last
column of Table 1, the five items have been administered in various waves
2From now on we will refer to “engagement in behaviours” simply as “behaviours”.
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and, therefore, in different times and countries. Four out of five items have
the third wave in common, whereas willingness to give part of the income
and to pay higher taxes has been asked in three and four waves, respectively.
The complete list of countries included in our study is available in Table 6
in Appendix A.
Table 1: List of variables and descriptive statistics.
variable mean sd min max obs waves
Willing to pay 20% higher price 2.474 0.850 1 4 52241 3
Willing to give part of the income 2.791 0.849 1 4 86795 2, 4, 5
Willing to pay higher taxes 2.661 0.869 1 4 142388 2, 3, 4, 5
Environmental action: recycle 0.476 0.499 0 1 46712 3
Environmental action: reduce water consumption 0.501 0.500 0 1 51252 3
Intrinsically motivated 0.0998 0.300 0 1 156611 3, 4, 5
Extrinsically motivated 0.377 0.485 0 1 156611 3, 4, 5
Age 40.99 15.86 16 99 156198 all
Female 0.514 0.500 0 1 156611 all
Scale of incomes 4.581 2.410 1 10 156611 all
Full-time 0.355 0.479 0 1 156611 all
Part-time 0.0726 0.259 0 1 156611 all
Self-employed 0.108 0.311 0 1 156611 all
Retired 0.123 0.329 0 1 156611 all
Housewife 0.127 0.334 0 1 156611 all
Student 0.0660 0.248 0 1 156611 all
Unemployed 0.0927 0.290 0 1 156611 all
Other 0.0229 0.150 0 1 156611 all
Married 0.588 0.492 0 1 156611 all
Living together as married 0.0626 0.242 0 1 156611 all
Divorced 0.0358 0.186 0 1 156611 all
Separated 0.0183 0.134 0 1 156611 all
Widowed 0.0593 0.236 0 1 156611 all
Single 0.234 0.423 0 1 156611 all
Number of children 1.902 1.760 0 8 153437 all
Primary education 0.305 0.461 0 1 147542 all
Secondary education 0.456 0.498 0 1 147542 all
Tertiary or higher education 0.239 0.426 0 1 147542 all
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ per capita (log) 9.266 1.010 6.764 11.34 152802 all
Human capital index 2.626 0.638 1.136 3.642 142148 all
Share of people trusting others 0.256 0.143 0.0282 0.746 156611 all
The main independent variables are people’s motivations. We distinguish
between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated people on the basis of re-
spondent’s answers to what they look for in a job. Respondents can provide
a first and second choice among the following list of options: 1. a good in-
come; 2. a safe job with no risk; 3. working with people you like; 4. doing
an important job that gives you a feeling of accomplishment; 5 do something
for community. We build two dichotomous and mutually exclusive variables
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to distinguish respondents with primarily intrinsic motivations from those
with primarily extrinsic motivations. We define as intrinsically motivated
the respondents who chose options 3, 4, or 5 as first and second choice when
looking for a job, zero otherwise. Extrinsically motivated people are those
who pick option 1 or 2 as their first and second choices when looking for a
job3. The two dummies are available for waves 3, 4, and 5. This procedure
is the same as in Salinas-Jiménez et al. (2010).
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Descriptive statistics indicate that on average 10% of respondents in the
pooled sample are intrinsically motivated, and 37.6% are extrinsically motiv-
ated. The correlation coefficient between the shares of people with purely in-
trinsic and extrinsic motivations is -0.76 significant at 1%, while the majority
of the respondents hold mixed motivations for all the five items. We altern-
atively use a single categorical variable set equal to one if the respondent is
3The coefficient of the Cronbach alpha between “a safe job” and “a good income” is
0.83, which suggests a high degree of internal validity. The coefficient is also high compared
to all the other combinations of variables for which we got coefficients below 0.60. These
findings indicate that “a good income” and “a safe job” contribute to a common, latent
concept. Additional tests using factor analysis confirm that the two variables contribute
to the same factor with similar factor loadings.
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extrinsically motivated, three if the respondent is intrinsically motivated, and
two for respondents exhibiting a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
For ease of use, we refer to it as Motivations. This variable is positively asso-
ciated to pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours. For instance, Figure
1 shows that the share of people willing to pay 20% higher price to protect
the environment is higher among people with intrinsic (59.7%) rather than
extrinsic (41.3%) motivations. Similarly, we observe that 64% of people with
intrinsic motivations does recycling, and this share reduces to 40% among
people with extrinsic motivations (see Figure 2). In sum, descriptive stat-
istics indicate that intrinsic (extrinsic) motivations increase (decrease) the
chances that people engage in pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours
(Figures 3 - 5 in Appendix B show the results for the other three measures).
Many factors can, however, make this observation spurious: education, age,
income, are all examples of possible factors that can stand behind the asso-
ciation we uncovered.
To account for this possibility, we adopt a regression design in which we
control for various, possible confounding factors. The list of control vari-
ables includes respondent’s age, gender, household income, working condi-
tions (full-time, part-time, self-employed, retired, housewife, student, un-
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employment, other), marital status (married, living together as married,
divorced, separated, widowed, single), education (primary, secondary, and
tertiary education or higher), and number of children. With the exception of
age, household income, and number of children – which are discrete variables
– all the others are encoded as dichotomous variables in which we assigned
value 1 if respondent has the mentioned characteristic (e.g. is married) and
zero otherwise. Finally, we include three macro variables to account for
the possible confounding effect of the context where respondents live: Gross
Domestic Product per capita (deflated to 2011 dollars at purchasing power
parity), the Human Capital Index (measured as average years of schooling),
and the share of people trusting others. The first two variables are sourced
from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2015) and we use them to
account for the different levels of wealth and development of the countries
included in the data. The third variable is derived from respondents’ answers
to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. This
is a dichotomous variable set equal to one if respondent declares to trust
others, and zero otherwise. The share of people trusting others is therefore
computed as the weighted average of the individual level variable by coun-
try and wave. This variable allows us to control for the average ability of a
population to cooperate to achieve common goals. Indeed, people may be
reluctant to adopt PEB because they fear to be the only ones or to be ex-
ploited by free-riders. However, Tam and Chan (2018) show that generalized
trust reduces this fear and facilitates PEB because it reassures people about
others’ commitment. In other words, the higher is trust among people in
a country, the easier they can adopt shared rules and behaviours, such as
recycling, to achieve common goals, i.e. protecting the environment.
4 Methods
4.1 Probit and ordered probit regressions
We start our analysis with a simple regression model. In case of Pro-En-
vironmental Attitudes (PEA) – in which the variables are categorical – we
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1 if yi ≤ c1,
2 if c1 < yi ≤ c2,
3 if c2 < yi ≤ c3,
4 if c3 < yi.
(1)
where i stands for respondents, yi represents an ordered dependent variable
for individual i, c1, c2 and c3 are unknown parameters to be estimated where
0 < c1 < c2 < c3; and PEAi is modelled as follows:
PEAi = α+ β1 · Intrinsici + β2 ·Extrinsici + θ ·Xi + εi, εi ∼ N(0, 1) (2)
where Xi is the vector of individual level control variables, namely: gender,
age (both in linear and squared form), employment status, marital status,
household income, number of children, education, along with country and
wave dummy variables (see Table 1 in section 3 for more details). The
two variables, Intrinsici and Extrinsici, are the identifiers of people with,
respectively, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Estimates use sampling
weights and robust standard errors clustered by country and year.
The variables about people’s pro-environmental behaviour (PEB), i.e.
recycling and reducing water consumption, are dichotomous. In this case,
we apply a probit model to an equation like 2. Also in this case we use
sampling weights and robust standard errors clustered by country and year.
4.2 Multilevel regressions
Country specific features, such as the level of development of a country, can
still affect our estimates. To correctly account for GDP per capita, Human
Capital Index and the share of trust in others (Trust), we resort to multilevel
(hierarchical) model. Formally, we estimate the following three-level linear
probability model with random intercept, in which individuals are nested
within countries, within country-years:
PEA/B
icj
= α0cj + β1Intrinsicicj + β2Extrinsicicj +BKXicj+
+ β3GDPcj + β4HCIcj + β5Trustcj + ǫicj
(3)
α0cj = γ00c + τcj (4)
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γ00c = γ000 + νc (5)
where i stands for respondents, the subscript c is the country where the
survey was administered, and j the year of the survey. For variables that were
observed only in one year, the model above is estimated only for two levels:
individuals within countries. Xicj is the same vector of control variables listed
for equation 2, and BK is a vector of respective coefficients. In the model,
we allow for random intercepts τjc and νc, i.e. the average of our dependent
variables varies randomly across countries and country-waves (see equations
4 and 5).
To account for possible non-linearities between motivations and the share
of people trusting others, we run also a variant of the model above in which we
include an interaction between motivations and the share of trust in others.
The coefficients of the interaction indicates the partial correlation between
intrinsic (extrinsic) motivations and pro-environmental attitudes and beha-
viours for marginal changes in the share of people trusting others.
4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares
The coefficients estimated with equation 2 indicate the sign and magnitude
of partial correlations among our variables of interest and pro-environmental
attitudes and behaviours. However, the coefficients may be affected by en-
dogeneity due to measurement error, omitted variable or reverse causality.
We test the robustness of our results to endogeneity issues using instrumental
variables and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), thus estimating a linear prob-
ability model. For this approach to work, we need one or more sources of
external variation that correlate meaningfully (‘relevance’ condition) with the
(potentially) endogenous variable (in this case, motivations), but not with
the dependent variables (‘orthogonality’ condition).
The WVS/EVS survey provides a non-self-reported variable that can be
used as an instrument: the inteviewer’s rating of whether the respondent
was interested during the interview (Interview). Possible ratings are: 1
“not very interested”; 2 “somewhat interested”; 3 “very interested”. We
consider the interviewer’s rating as an external source of information about
respondent’s motivation to cooperate and do their part for a greater good,
i.e. answering lengthy questionnaires for the sake of scientific research. We
expect interviewer’s ratings to correlate positively with intrinsic motivations,
and negatively with extrinsic ones. Respondent’s education is another eli-
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gible instrument for motivations. Indeed, education provides the skill to
process information, including information on the environmental problem,
and hence to form personal motivations and goals, including pro-environ-
mental motivations. One may object that education may correlate with the
dependent variable independently from motivations. This could be the case
if, for instance, teaching how to protect the environment were part of the
educational curricula of schools worldwide. We can’t exclude this possibility,
but we observe that this is a minor practice. We thus use interviewer’s rating
and two levels of education as instruments, and, for parsimony reason, the
variableMotivations in the 2SLS rather than the two dummies Intrinsic and
Extrinsic.
Formally, the 2SLS model is as follows:
First stage:
Motivationsi = α1 + β · IVi + θ ·Xi + µi (6)
Second stage:
PEA/Bi = α2 + π · ̂Motivationsi + θ ·Xi + ηi (7)
where Motivationsi is the single categorical variable mentioned in section
3; IVi is the vector of excluded instruments; Xi is the vector of control
variables described for equation 2; β and θ are two vectors of coefficients to
be estimated; µ and η are the error terms. We use sampling weights and
robust standard errors.
5 Results
Tables 2 and 3 summarize our main results. We find that intrinsic motivations
correlate with higher respondents’ willingess to protect the environment. On
the contrary, respondents with extrinsic motivations have a higher probability
to report less pro-environmental attitudes (see Table 2). The same result
holds if we consider people’s reported behaviours (see Table 3). All the
coefficients are statistically significant at least at 1%. The large variation in
sample size across estimates is due to the fact that the variables have been
collected in different waves.
The association between motivations and pro-environmental attitudes
and behaviours does not depend on individual control variables, such as
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occupation, income, age, gender, education, marital status and number of
children. Among these variables, the best predictors are the educational
levels, which is consistent with previous findings (Blankeberg and Alhusen,
2018). The magnitudes of McFadden’s pseudo R2 are all rather low except in
model 4, which predicts recycling. In this case, the pseudo R2 is 0.22. These
coefficients indicate that the models fit the data rather well, although our
models seem to predict better attitudes than behaviours.
Table 2: Association between intrinsic or extrinsic motivations and pro-en-
vironmental attitudes. The table reports marginal effects after ordered probit
model with country and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors for
three variables. The results of ordered probit estimates are available in Ap-
pendix C.
Would buy things at a 20% higher price if it would help protect the environment
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
Intrinsically motivated -0.0406∗∗∗ (-7.41) -0.0395∗∗∗ (-6.93) 0.0411∗∗∗ (7.06) 0.0390∗∗∗ (7.37)
Extrinsically motivated 0.0305∗∗∗ (7.64) 0.0297∗∗∗ (7.01) -0.0308∗∗∗ (-7.00) -0.0293∗∗∗ (-7.81)
Observations 49568 49568 49568 49568
Would give part of my income for the environment
Intrinsically motivated -0.0276∗∗∗ (-9.04) -0.0379∗∗∗ (-9.61) 0.0146∗∗∗ (8.73) 0.0508∗∗∗ (9.56)
Extrinsically motivated 0.0281∗∗∗ (9.52) 0.0386∗∗∗ (11.94) -0.0149∗∗∗ (-11.12) -0.0518∗∗∗ (-10.60)
Observations 79439 79439 79439 79439
Increase in taxes if used to prevent environmental damage
Intrinsically motivated -0.0332∗∗∗ (-9.11) -0.0380∗∗∗ (-10.25) 0.0263∗∗∗ (9.70) 0.0448∗∗∗ (9.69)
Extrinsically motivated 0.0277∗∗∗ (10.37) 0.0317∗∗∗ (10.94) -0.0220∗∗∗ (-10.08) -0.0374∗∗∗ (-11.11)
Observations 132354 132354 132354 132354
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: Association between intrinsic or extrinsic motivations and pro-
environmental behaviours. The table reports marginal effects after probit
model with country and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors for
two variables. The results of probit estimates are available in Appendix C.
Recycle Reduce water consumption
Intrinsically motivated 0.0391∗∗∗ (5.07) 0.0506∗∗∗ (5.05)
Extrinsically motivated -0.0382∗∗∗ (-4.18) -0.0493∗∗∗ (-5.44)
Observations 44221 48712
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The three behavioural variables reflect people’s propensity to incur in
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higher costs to protect the environment. However, the WVS/EVS are gen-
eral population surveys, thus it is possible that our results are driven by
subgroups of the population, like employed and non-employed respondents.
Since we observe motivations via the desired aspects in a job, it is possible
that motivations differ for employed and non-employed people. To account
for this possibility, we first included a control for employment status in our
main regressions, and, secondly, we repeated our analysis only on the sub-set
of respondents in occupation. The second set of estimates confirms our main
results (for more details, see Table 8 in Appendix C).
Similarly, our coefficients may be driven by the inclusion in the sample
of very heterogeneous countries. To address this possibility, we adopted two
strategies: first, we repeated our baseline regression analysis on the sub-set
of respondents from OECD member states. Results are very similar, both in
magnitude and significance, to our main results (for more details, see Table 9
in Appendix C; second, we account for the resources available to a country by
controlling for GDP per capita, human capital, the share of people trusting
others and its interaction with motivations in a multilevel regression analysis.
Table 4 summarizes the key figures from the complete set of results available
in Appendix D.
Table 4: Summary of results from multilevel regression model. The table
reports the coefficients of a random intercept, linear probability model in
which individuals are nested within countries with years. For dependent
variables observed only in one wave, we omit the third level (year). The
detailed tables with results are available in Appendix D.
Pay 20% Give part Pay higher Recycling Reduce water
more of income taxes consumption
Intrinsically motivated 0.088∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
Extrinsically motivated -0.082∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
GDP per capita (log) 0.0547 -0.029 -0.022 0.167∗∗∗ 0.03
Human capital index -0.191∗ -0.242∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.06 -.006
Share of trust in others -0.164 0.184 0.423∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ -0.198
Int. motivated * Trust (share) 0.211∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ -0.084 -0.028
Ext. motivated * Trust (share) -0.157∗ -0.06 -0.122∗∗ 0.039 0.037
The results from the multilevel model are comparable to those from the
baseline model: intrinsically (extrinsically) motivated people are more likely
to be willing to adopt pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours. The coef-
ficients are larger in magnitude than in the baseline model, but of similar
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statistical significance. The fact that we are modelling categorical variables
as continuous can explain the larger size of the coefficients from multilevel
regressions. In other words, accounting for macro level variables does not sig-
nificantly alter our results. This indicates that country and year effects play
a minor role in the relationship between motivations and pro-environmental
attitudes and behaviours. The analysis of macro variables does not reveal any
clear pattern: people in richer countries are more likely to do recycling, but
this relationship is not confirmed for all the remaining variables; human cap-
ital is negatively and significantly correlated to pro-environmental attitudes,
but not to behaviours (although the sign remains negative). The interaction
of motivations with the share of people trusting others reveals that people
with intrinsic motivations and living in countries with high shares of trust
in others have higher probability to be willing to adopt pro-environmental
attitudes. The main effect of the share of trust in others does not show any
consistent association with our dependent variables, whereas the main effects
of motivations decreases. This suggests that part of the relationship between
motivations and pro-environmental behaviours is mediated by the share of
people trusting others. This confirms our findings that motivations matter,
and it adds that it is important to trust others, probably because trust fa-
cilitates the efficacy of collective action. However, this result holds only for
attitudes: the interaction effect for the two proxies of pro-environmental be-
haviours is not statistically different from zero. In these cases, the share of
people trusting others does not add to individual motivations.
In sum, the results from multilevel model confirm our main results, but
add little to our understanding of the role of contextual variables. However,
it seems safe to say that trusting others boosts the role of motivations for
pro-environmental attitudes, but not behaviours: the fact that people trust
others increases the probability that they would be willing to pay for the
environment, but it does not change their behaviours.
6 Addressing endogeneity issues
As it is often the case with the analysis of survey data with self-reported
variables, we cannot exclude the possibility that endogeneity affects our coef-
ficients. We adopt 2SLS with instrumental variables to address this issue.
As discussed in section 4, we identified three suitable instruments: re-
spondent’s interest as reported by the interviewer, secondary and tertiary
16
education. Table 5 summarizes the results for our five dependent variables
(see Table 15 in Appendix E for the complete set of results). Our three in-
struments are significantly and positively associated with Motivations in
the first stage. We recall that we use a single variable to measure Motiva-
tions in 2SLS for parsimony. A high (low) score for the variable Motivations
indicates intrinsic (extrinsic) motivations. The positive coefficients of our in-
struments indicate that the higher the respondent’s interest and education,
the higher his/her intrinsic motivations. The coefficients of Motivations are
consistently positive and significant, thus confirming our finding that intrins-
ically motivated people are more willing to adopt pro-environmental attitudes
and behaviours. The diagnostics related to our identification strategy are en-
couraging: the tests of weak instruments, and of underidentification suggest
that the instruments are valid: the Kleibergen-Paap test of weak instruments
provide coefficients that are all above the Stock-Yogo critical values, whereas
the highly significant coefficients of the underidentification tests allow us to
reject the null that the equation is underidentified. In other words, this evid-
ence suggests that the excluded instruments are relevant, i.e. they correlate
with the endogenous regressors. Finally, the p-values of the Hansen J stat-
istic test of overidentifying restrictions are always not significant. We can
thus not reject the null that the instruments are valid, i.e. they are uncor-
related with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation.
Table 5: Motivations and pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes using
2SLS and instrumental variables. The table reports the coefficients of linear
probability models with sample weights and robust standard errors.
Pay 20% more Give part of income Pay higher taxes Recycling Reduce water consumption
first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage
Resp.’ interest 0.105∗∗∗ (7.68) 0.0814∗∗∗ (5.86) 0.0930∗∗∗ (9.14) 0.0714∗∗∗ (8.88) 0.101∗∗∗ (8.37)
Secondary education 0.0571∗∗ (2.92) 0.0988∗∗∗ (6.85) 0.0810∗∗∗ (6.66) 0.0834∗∗∗ (6.56) 0.0720∗∗∗ (4.66)
Tertiary education or higher 0.186∗∗∗ (7.55) 0.228∗∗∗ (8.92) 0.214∗∗∗ (11.62) 0.209∗∗∗ (10.10) 0.198∗∗∗ (8.38)
Motivations 0.867∗∗∗ (7.35) 1.063∗∗∗ (6.82) 0.930∗∗∗ (9.02) 0.524∗∗∗ (7.88) 0.372∗∗∗ (4.87)
N 48371 48371 75336 75336 126953 126953 42997 42997 47491 47491
RMSE 0.618 0.955 0.604 0.990 0.611 0.977 0.597 0.516 0.615 0.527
Hansen J statistics 3.748 1.567 3.017 3.905 2.520
p-value 0.153 0.457 0.221 0.142 0.284
Underidentification test 31.50 38.09 66.36 27.63 29.92
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification test 40.47 36.83 72.15 52.20 43.10
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7 Conclusions
The relationship between intrinsic motivation and pro-environmental beha-
viours is rather explored in the literature. However, it is yet not clear how
to interpret ‘intrinsic motivation’, and how to contrast it with ‘extrinsic mo-
tivation’. We contribute to the literature by exploring an interpretation of
motivations that refers to how people approach goals in life, rather than to
environmental issues. The example of the goal of a good job seems well rep-
resentative, because it is usually a central goal in life, and the motivations
in looking for a job can be clearly distinguished.
We use data from the integrated World Values Survey / European Values
Study dataset, which provide a large set of repeated, cross-country data on
a number of relevant variables. We analyse the association between motiva-
tions (both intrinsic and extrinsic) with three measures of pro-environmental
attitudes (willingness to pay 20% higher prices, to give part of their income,
and to pay higher taxes for the environment) and two measures of behaviours
(respondent’s declaration that he/she does recycling and reduces water con-
sumption). We measure people’s motivations based on their answers to what
they look for in a job: we define as intrinsically motivated people those who
prioritize the community feeling and personal accomplishment, whereas we
consider extrinsically motivated people those who prioritize aspects such as
income and security of the job. Our baseline results hinge on probit and
ordered probit estimates in which we account for a number of individual
level control variables, country and year fixed effects and robust standard
errors clustered by country and year.
Figures indicate clear associations between motivations and concerns for
the environment. Intrinsically motivated people have a higher probability
to be willing to pay 20% higher prices, higher taxes and to be willing to
give part of their income to protect the environment. Similarly, intrinsic-
ally motivated people are more likely to do recycling and to reduce water
consumption. The contrary holds for extrinsically motivated people. The
size of the coefficients changes depending on the attitude or behaviour we
consider, but differences are small. For example, to be intrinsically motiv-
ated increases the probability to strongly agree to pay things at 20% higher
price by nearly 4 percentage points, whereas to be extrinsically motivated
reduces the same probability by about 3 percentage points. The difference
in the probability between the two groups of people is some points larger
for the other pro-environmental variables we considered. These results do
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not depend on respondent’s age, gender, marital status, number of children,
education, employment or income.
Our result is remarkably robust to various specifications of the model (if
we restrict the analysis only to the sample of people in occupation or of people
living in OECD countries), and to different regression models. To account for
country or country-year sources of variability - i.e. GDP per capita, human
capital or trust in others – we run multilevel regression analysis with random
intercept. The results confirm our findings and add the role of the share of
people trusting others.
The interaction of motivations with the share of people trusting others re-
veals that people with both intrinsic motivations and living in countries with
high shares of trust in others have higher probability to be willing to adopt
pro-environmental attitudes. This confirms our findings that motivations
matter, and it adds that it is important to trust others. That is probably
because ultimately the protection of the environment is the result of a joint
effort, and trust facilitates cooperation. However, this is true only for atti-
tudes: we did not find a significant interaction effect for the two proxies of
pro-environmental behaviours.
Finally, our results appear robust to possible endogeneity bias. We used
2SLS with instrumental variables to predict motivations and test the associ-
ation of the predicted variable with pro-environmental attitudes and beha-
viours. Estimates confirm that intrinsically (extrinsically) motivated people
are more (less) willing to care for the environment. Diagnostics lend support
to our identification strategy.
These results shed some light on the limits of the incentives for pro-
environmental behaviours, and suggest that decision makers who want to
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A List of countries
Table 6: List of countries by variable.
Pay 20% more Give part of income Pay higher taxes Recycling Reduce water consumption
Albania Albania Thailand Albania Puerto Rico Albania Albania
Azerbaijan Andorra Trinidad and Tobago Andorra Romania Azerbaijan Azerbaijan
Argentina Argentina Turkey Azerbaijan Russia Argentina Argentina
Australia Australia Uganda Argentina Rwanda Australia Australia
Bangladesh Bangladesh Ukraine Australia Serbia Bangladesh Bangladesh
Armenia Bosnia Herzegovina Macedonia Bangladesh Singapore Armenia Armenia
Brazil Brazil Egypt Armenia Slovakia Brazil Brazil
Bulgaria Bulgaria Tanzania Bosnia Herzegovina Vietnam Bulgaria Bulgaria
SrpSka Republic Canada United States Brazil Slovenia SrpSka Republic SrpSka Republic
Belarus Chile Burkina Faso Bulgaria South Africa Belarus Belarus
Chile China Uruguay SrpSka Republic Zimbabwe Chile Chile
China Taiwan Zambia Belarus Spain China China
Taiwan Cyprus Canada Sweden Taiwan Taiwan
Croatia Ethiopia Chile Switzerland Croatia Croatia
Czech Rep. Finland China Thailand Czech Rep. Czech Rep.
Dominican Rep. Georgia Taiwan Trinidad and Tobago Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep.
Estonia Germany Colombia Turkey Estonia Estonia
Finland Ghana Croatia Uganda Finland Finland
Georgia Guatemala Cyprus Ukraine Georgia Georgia
Germany Hungary Czech Rep. Macedonia Germany Germany
Hungary India Dominican Rep. Egypt Hungary Hungary
India Indonesia Ethiopia Tanzania India India
Japan Iran Estonia United States Japan Japan
South Korea Italy Finland Burkina Faso South Korea South Korea
Latvia Japan Georgia Uruguay Lithuania Latvia
Lithuania Jordan Germany Venezuela Mexico Lithuania
Mexico South Korea Ghana Zambia Montenegro Mexico
Moldova Kyrgyzstan Guatemala Bosnia New Zealand Moldova
Montenegro Malaysia Hungary Nigeria Montenegro
New Zealand Mali India Norway New Zealand
Nigeria Mexico Indonesia Peru Nigeria
Norway Moldova Iran Philippines Norway
Peru Montenegro Italy Puerto Rico Peru
Philippines Morocco Japan Romania Philippines
Puerto Rico New Zealand Jordan Russia Puerto Rico
Romania Norway South Korea Serbia Romania
Russia Peru Kyrgyzstan Slovakia Russia
Serbia Philippines Latvia Slovenia Serbia
Slovakia Poland Lithuania South Africa Slovakia
Slovenia Puerto Rico Malaysia Spain Slovenia
South Africa Romania Mali Sweden South Africa
Spain Rwanda Mexico Macedonia Spain
Sweden Serbia Moldova United States Sweden
Switzerland Singapore Montenegro Uruguay Ukraine
Turkey Vietnam Morocco Venezuela Macedonia
Ukraine Slovenia New Zealand Bosnia United States
Macedonia South Africa Nigeria Uruguay
United States Zimbabwe Norway Venezuela
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Figure 4: Correlation between willingness to accept higher taxes if used to
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C Probit and ordered probit regressions
27
Table 7: Baseline estimates on the complete sample of respondents.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buy things at a higher price Give part of the income Increase in taxes Recycle Reduce water consumption
Part-time -0.0124 0.0431∗ 0.0308 0.00272 0.00708
(-0.58) (2.19) (1.93) (0.08) (0.15)
Self-employed -0.0329 0.0379 -0.0118 0.0337 0.00381
(-1.02) (1.61) (-0.67) (1.21) (0.09)
Retired -0.0856∗∗∗ -0.0416∗ -0.0537∗∗ -0.0149 0.0360
(-3.86) (-1.99) (-3.12) (-0.49) (1.24)
Housewife -0.0449∗∗ -0.000385 -0.0340∗ -0.0749 0.00754
(-2.58) (-0.02) (-2.33) (-1.50) (0.23)
Student 0.0348 0.0731∗∗ 0.0378 -0.00635 -0.0611
(1.15) (2.86) (1.83) (-0.14) (-1.10)
Unemployed 0.00778 0.0170 0.00133 -0.0883∗ -0.0296
(0.34) (0.53) (0.07) (-2.38) (-0.73)
Other -0.0539 -0.0365 -0.0567∗ -0.114 -0.106
(-1.13) (-0.97) (-2.20) (-1.70) (-1.81)
Middle income 0.0364 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗ 0.0784 0.0457
(1.61) (3.93) (2.59) (1.33) (1.06)
High income 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106 0.0102
(3.75) (5.31) (5.08) (1.76) (0.22)
Age -0.00371 -0.00301 -0.00349∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗
(-1.76) (-1.52) (-1.99) (3.49) (6.38)
Age squared/100 0.00270 0.00498∗ 0.00474∗∗ -0.0126∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗
(1.15) (2.37) (2.61) (-3.16) (-4.80)
Female 0.0498∗∗∗ -0.000616 0.0179∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(3.33) (-0.05) (1.96) (5.16) (5.02)
Married 0.0171 -0.00645 0.00572 0.0904∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(1.01) (-0.38) (0.48) (2.85) (2.99)
Living together as married 0.00865 0.00232 -0.00173 -0.00379 0.0321
(0.23) (0.10) (-0.09) (-0.11) (0.71)
Divorced -0.0758∗ -0.0147 -0.0290 0.00562 0.111∗
(-2.35) (-0.55) (-1.28) (0.10) (1.97)
Separated -0.0459 -0.0183 -0.0199 0.0195 0.130∗
(-0.99) (-0.57) (-0.84) (0.31) (2.44)
Widowed -0.0766∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.0626 0.0809
(-2.97) (-4.49) (-5.38) (1.51) (1.83)
1 child 0.0244 0.0123 0.00363 -0.0199 0.0162
(1.44) (0.69) (0.29) (-0.65) (0.62)
2 children -0.00416 0.0184 0.00999 -0.0266 -0.0223
(-0.21) (1.16) (0.79) (-0.90) (-0.69)
3 children -0.0378 -0.0216 -0.0174 -0.0375 -0.0388
(-1.64) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.00) (-1.03)
4 children -0.0444 -0.0281 -0.0445∗ -0.0413 -0.0704
(-1.51) (-1.22) (-2.40) (-0.82) (-1.40)
5 children -0.00636 -0.0512 -0.0431∗ -0.120∗ -0.0920
(-0.20) (-1.76) (-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.60)
6 children 0.0745 0.0258 -0.0500 -0.119 -0.173∗
(1.40) (0.67) (-1.53) (-1.71) (-2.30)
7 children -0.0352 -0.0389 -0.0415 -0.0457 -0.113
(-0.46) (-0.57) (-0.92) (-0.62) (-1.37)
8 children or more 0.0226 -0.0800 -0.0645 -0.137 -0.110
(0.44) (-1.78) (-1.74) (-1.49) (-1.33)
Secondary education 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(3.42) (6.36) (7.21) (4.72) (3.54)
Tertiary education or higher 0.152∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(5.81) (9.66) (10.23) (7.64) (3.80)
Intrinsically motivated 0.211∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(7.44) (9.89) (9.93) (5.07) (5.04)
Extrinsically motivated -0.158∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(-7.62) (-11.59) (-11.05) (-4.17) (-5.44)
Constant -0.912∗∗∗ -1.043∗∗∗
(-10.50) (-11.59)
cut1 -1.080∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗ -1.005∗∗∗
(-16.43) (-18.50) (-12.67)
cut2 0.190∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗ 0.0366
(3.35) (-3.13) (0.50)
cut3 1.400∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗
(18.75) (25.47) (17.69)
Observations 49568 79439 132354 44221 48712
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.052 0.037 0.220 0.090
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Estimates limited to the sample of employed people only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buy things at a higher price Give part of the income Increase in taxes Recycle Reduce water consumption
Part-time -0.00686 0.0406 0.0343 0.00342 0.0103
(-0.28) (1.90) (1.96) (0.09) (0.22)
Self-employed -0.0326 0.0345 -0.0189 0.0113 -0.00938
(-0.95) (1.40) (-1.04) (0.42) (-0.23)
Middle income 0.0290 0.0571∗∗ 0.0324 0.0712 0.0444
(0.98) (2.75) (1.66) (1.01) (0.78)
High income 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.00870
(3.32) (4.59) (4.31) (2.44) (0.16)
Age -0.000600 -0.00661 -0.00512 0.00392 0.0198∗∗∗
(-0.15) (-1.66) (-1.90) (0.67) (3.35)
Age squared/100 -0.000213 0.00990∗ 0.00789∗∗ -0.00297 -0.0148∗
(-0.05) (2.18) (2.60) (-0.43) (-2.14)
Female 0.0601∗∗∗ -0.00149 0.0246∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(3.36) (-0.09) (2.13) (4.99) (3.89)
Married 0.0307 -0.000564 0.0186 0.105∗∗ 0.104∗
(1.31) (-0.03) (1.16) (3.08) (2.49)
Living together as married -0.00899 0.00322 0.00414 -0.0445 -0.000932
(-0.23) (0.12) (0.17) (-1.01) (-0.02)
Divorced -0.0563 -0.00145 -0.0262 0.0184 0.118
(-1.49) (-0.04) (-0.88) (0.34) (1.91)
Separated -0.0147 -0.0652 -0.0366 -0.0118 0.152∗
(-0.26) (-1.59) (-0.99) (-0.16) (2.31)
Widowed -0.0818∗ -0.0647 -0.111∗∗∗ 0.121 0.0556
(-2.25) (-1.57) (-3.67) (1.66) (0.95)
1 child 0.0136 -0.00676 -0.00538 0.00331 0.0409
(0.55) (-0.31) (-0.31) (0.08) (1.25)
2 children -0.000209 0.0106 0.0124 -0.0175 -0.00974
(-0.01) (0.54) (0.72) (-0.46) (-0.27)
3 children -0.0330 -0.0388 -0.0149 -0.0348 -0.00514
(-1.06) (-1.73) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.12)
4 children -0.0610 -0.000479 -0.0261 -0.0390 -0.0424
(-1.41) (-0.01) (-0.94) (-0.70) (-0.71)
5 children 0.0509 -0.0620 -0.0357 -0.0791 -0.0842
(1.11) (-1.77) (-1.19) (-1.04) (-1.12)
6 children -0.00689 -0.0433 -0.0680 -0.0866 -0.149
(-0.07) (-0.83) (-1.46) (-1.06) (-1.44)
7 children -0.0269 0.110 -0.00686 -0.0836 -0.225
(-0.25) (1.56) (-0.08) (-0.62) (-1.58)
8 children or more 0.108 -0.0486 -0.0783 -0.0547 -0.0266
(0.97) (-0.96) (-1.48) (-0.36) (-0.20)
Secondary education 0.0754∗ 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.150∗
(2.57) (3.71) (5.18) (3.29) (2.46)
Tertiary education or higher 0.168∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(4.96) (8.23) (9.40) (6.17) (2.93)
Intrinsically motivated 0.199∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(6.57) (10.53) (9.78) (3.57) (3.83)
Extrinsically motivated -0.159∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(-7.73) (-12.35) (-10.97) (-3.83) (-5.19)
Constant -0.800∗∗∗ -1.044∗∗∗
(-6.43) (-10.06)
cut1 -0.961∗∗∗ -1.304∗∗∗ -1.024∗∗∗
(-10.80) (-14.53) (-11.35)
cut2 0.307∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ 0.0293
(3.44) (-3.64) (0.34)
cut3 1.537∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗
(14.31) (14.79) (15.80)
Observations 27125 42721 71876 23954 26436
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.050 0.036 0.201 0.079
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Estimates limited to the sample of respondents from OECD coun-
tries only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buy things at a higher price Give part of the income Increase in taxes Recycle Reduce water consumption
Part-time 0.00890 0.0732∗ 0.0414 0.0215 0.0229
(0.39) (2.49) (1.93) (0.33) (0.39)
Self-employed -0.00720 0.111∗∗ 0.0411 -0.0211 -0.00220
(-0.13) (2.87) (1.21) (-0.52) (-0.05)
Retired -0.0943∗ 0.00927 -0.0132 0.0366 0.0828
(-2.18) (0.31) (-0.47) (0.67) (1.88)
Housewife -0.0619∗ 0.0278 -0.0227 -0.0892∗ -0.0218
(-2.20) (1.34) (-1.08) (-2.07) (-0.48)
Student 0.0640 0.132∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0708 0.00316
(1.64) (4.46) (4.82) (1.35) (0.12)
Unemployed 0.0219 -0.0174 0.0139 -0.0798 0.00759
(0.37) (-0.38) (0.42) (-1.07) (0.13)
Other -0.140 0.0982 -0.0598 0.249∗∗ -0.0839
(-1.89) (1.75) (-1.36) (2.76) (-1.13)
Middle income 0.0104 0.0915∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗ 0.0927∗ -0.0232
(0.36) (3.71) (3.21) (2.30) (-0.71)
High income 0.0706∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0824 -0.0935∗
(2.71) (5.01) (4.05) (1.54) (-2.26)
Age -0.000891 0.00101 0.00193 0.0164∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗
(-0.23) (0.45) (0.76) (2.77) (11.86)
Age squared/100 0.000184 0.00113 0.000110 -0.0181∗∗ -0.0274∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.49) (0.04) (-2.82) (-8.51)
Female 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0140 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(4.84) (0.74) (3.98) (3.55) (6.50)
Married 0.0502∗ -0.0264 -0.0138 0.176∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(1.98) (-0.84) (-0.59) (3.25) (2.82)
Living together as married 0.00286 0.0271 -0.00574 0.0734 0.0318
(0.07) (0.75) (-0.21) (1.72) (0.49)
Divorced -0.0492 -0.0167 -0.0459 0.0248 0.0737
(-1.17) (-0.42) (-1.70) (0.35) (1.02)
Separated -0.0545 -0.0448 -0.0478 0.0764 0.0584
(-0.88) (-1.03) (-1.52) (0.73) (0.84)
Widowed 0.00239 -0.113∗∗ -0.0764∗ 0.144∗ 0.0835
(0.07) (-2.75) (-2.36) (2.38) (1.47)
1 child -0.0195 -0.0496 -0.0110 -0.0390 0.0156
(-0.83) (-1.70) (-0.50) (-0.76) (0.45)
2 children -0.0375 -0.00842 -0.0108 0.0237 -0.0231
(-1.34) (-0.30) (-0.50) (0.39) (-0.53)
3 children -0.0749 -0.0254 -0.00313 0.0480 0.00824
(-1.77) (-1.01) (-0.14) (0.75) (0.14)
4 children -0.0890 -0.0582 -0.0410 0.00602 -0.00690
(-1.81) (-1.34) (-1.68) (0.07) (-0.10)
5 children -0.0903 -0.0812 -0.0989∗∗ -0.136 -0.105
(-1.41) (-1.46) (-3.00) (-1.05) (-1.06)
6 children 0.0402 0.0249 -0.0697 -0.0830 -0.0336
(0.38) (0.28) (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.26)
7 children -0.148 -0.187 -0.225∗ 0.00601 -0.256
(-1.10) (-1.46) (-2.19) (0.04) (-1.29)
8 children or more -0.0881 -0.112∗ -0.120 -0.0649 -0.0103
(-1.06) (-2.06) (-1.89) (-0.44) (-0.09)
Secondary education 0.0436 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.0718
(1.43) (4.42) (3.36) (5.16) (1.78)
Tertiary education or higher 0.112∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.110∗
(2.86) (7.82) (6.64) (7.44) (2.09)
Intrinsically motivated 0.233∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(5.15) (7.53) (7.13) (5.25) (2.79)
Extrinsically motivated -0.200∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.0984∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-6.59) (-8.85) (-3.92) (-3.99)
Constant 0.405∗∗∗ -0.837∗∗∗
(4.23) (-10.66)
cut1 -0.880∗∗∗ -1.038∗∗∗ -0.787∗∗∗
(-7.24) (-8.95) (-5.91)
cut2 0.377∗∗∗ -0.0739 0.201
(3.90) (-0.73) (1.53)
cut3 1.663∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗
(13.40) (16.32) (11.47)
Observations 18356 26014 44638 14964 16119
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.050 0.032 0.162 0.106
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D Multilevel regressions
Table 10: Results from multilevel regression model. The dependent variable
is people’s willingness to pay 20% higher price to protect the environment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motivations Trust (share) Int. Motiv.*Trust (share) Ext. Motiv.*Trust (share) Full model
Middle income 0.0251∗ (2.51) 0.0252∗ (2.52) 0.0260∗∗ (2.60) 0.0260∗∗ (2.59) 0.0265∗∗ (2.64)
High income 0.0761∗∗∗ (6.37) 0.0762∗∗∗ (6.38) 0.0769∗∗∗ (6.44) 0.0770∗∗∗ (6.44) 0.0774∗∗∗ (6.48)
Secondary education 0.0631∗∗∗ (6.06) 0.0630∗∗∗ (6.06) 0.0630∗∗∗ (6.06) 0.0627∗∗∗ (6.02) 0.0628∗∗∗ (6.03)
Tertiary education or higher 0.119∗∗∗ (9.28) 0.119∗∗∗ (9.28) 0.118∗∗∗ (9.25) 0.118∗∗∗ (9.21) 0.118∗∗∗ (9.20)
Married 0.0169 (1.07) 0.0170 (1.08) 0.0164 (1.04) 0.0171 (1.08) 0.0166 (1.05)
Living together as married -0.000503 (-0.02) -0.000435 (-0.02) -0.000849 (-0.04) -0.000419 (-0.02) -0.000773 (-0.04)
Divorced -0.0544∗ (-2.23) -0.0544∗ (-2.23) -0.0543∗ (-2.22) -0.0539∗ (-2.21) -0.0540∗ (-2.21)
Separated -0.00838 (-0.25) -0.00841 (-0.25) -0.00933 (-0.28) -0.00877 (-0.26) -0.00948 (-0.29)
Widowed -0.0481∗ (-2.02) -0.0481∗ (-2.02) -0.0484∗ (-2.03) -0.0478∗ (-2.01) -0.0481∗ (-2.02)
1 child 0.0129 (0.84) 0.0128 (0.84) 0.0132 (0.86) 0.0132 (0.86) 0.0135 (0.88)
2 children -0.0124 (-0.84) -0.0124 (-0.84) -0.0123 (-0.83) -0.0123 (-0.83) -0.0122 (-0.82)
3 children -0.0266 (-1.57) -0.0266 (-1.57) -0.0264 (-1.56) -0.0267 (-1.58) -0.0265 (-1.57)
4 children -0.0432∗ (-2.09) -0.0432∗ (-2.09) -0.0430∗ (-2.08) -0.0431∗ (-2.09) -0.0430∗ (-2.08)
5 children -0.0162 (-0.61) -0.0162 (-0.61) -0.0165 (-0.62) -0.0165 (-0.62) -0.0166 (-0.62)
6 children 0.0127 (0.35) 0.0126 (0.35) 0.0129 (0.36) 0.0130 (0.36) 0.0132 (0.37)
7 children 0.0153 (0.32) 0.0152 (0.32) 0.0149 (0.32) 0.0151 (0.32) 0.0149 (0.32)
8 children or more 0.0263 (0.61) 0.0262 (0.60) 0.0246 (0.57) 0.0255 (0.59) 0.0244 (0.56)
Part-time -0.0150 (-0.95) -0.0150 (-0.95) -0.0156 (-0.99) -0.0146 (-0.93) -0.0152 (-0.96)
Self-employed -0.0190 (-1.26) -0.0191 (-1.27) -0.0189 (-1.26) -0.0192 (-1.27) -0.0190 (-1.26)
Retired -0.0598∗∗∗ (-3.45) -0.0599∗∗∗ (-3.45) -0.0599∗∗∗ (-3.45) -0.0602∗∗∗ (-3.47) -0.0601∗∗∗ (-3.47)
Housewife -0.0351∗ (-2.28) -0.0352∗ (-2.28) -0.0351∗ (-2.27) -0.0354∗ (-2.30) -0.0353∗ (-2.29)
Student 0.0168 (0.85) 0.0168 (0.85) 0.0168 (0.85) 0.0170 (0.86) 0.0170 (0.86)
Unemployed 0.0112 (0.69) 0.0112 (0.68) 0.0110 (0.67) 0.0113 (0.69) 0.0111 (0.68)
Other -0.0384 (-1.28) -0.0384 (-1.28) -0.0389 (-1.30) -0.0387 (-1.29) -0.0390 (-1.30)
Female 0.0441∗∗∗ (4.96) 0.0441∗∗∗ (4.96) 0.0436∗∗∗ (4.90) 0.0438∗∗∗ (4.92) 0.0435∗∗∗ (4.88)
Age -0.00164 (-0.91) -0.00164 (-0.92) -0.00164 (-0.91) -0.00166 (-0.92) -0.00165 (-0.92)
Age squared/100 0.000905 (0.46) 0.000907 (0.46) 0.000911 (0.47) 0.000930 (0.48) 0.000928 (0.48)
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ (log) 0.0523 (1.10) 0.0566 (1.18) 0.0556 (1.16) 0.0553 (1.15) 0.0547 (1.14)
Human capital index -0.205∗∗ (-2.83) -0.193∗ (-2.56) -0.192∗ (-2.54) -0.192∗ (-2.55) -0.191∗ (-2.53)
Share of people trusting others -0.158 (-0.60) -0.202 (-0.77) -0.111 (-0.42) -0.158 (-0.60)
Intrinsically motivated 0.157∗∗∗ (11.94) 0.157∗∗∗ (11.94) 0.0777∗∗ (2.66) 0.155∗∗∗ (11.78) 0.0884∗∗ (2.98)
Intrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) 0.249∗∗ (3.05) 0.211∗ (2.52)
Extrinsically motivated -0.122∗∗∗ (-13.63) -0.122∗∗∗ (-13.63) -0.123∗∗∗ (-13.74) -0.0703∗∗∗ (-3.32) -0.0819∗∗∗ (-3.78)
Extrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) -0.198∗∗ (-2.72) -0.157∗ (-2.11)
Constant 2.521∗∗∗ (7.23) 2.492∗∗∗ (7.12) 2.511∗∗∗ (7.15) 2.489∗∗∗ (7.08) 2.505∗∗∗ (7.11)
lns1 1 1 -1.649∗∗∗ (-14.09) -1.654∗∗∗ (-14.13) -1.651∗∗∗ (-14.10) -1.650∗∗∗ (-14.09) -1.648∗∗∗ (-14.08)
lnsig e -0.205∗∗∗ (-59.00) -0.205∗∗∗ (-59.00) -0.205∗∗∗ (-59.03) -0.205∗∗∗ (-59.03) -0.205∗∗∗ (-59.05)
Observations 41646 41646 41646 41646 41646
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Results from multilevel regression model. The dependent variable
is people’s willingness to give part of own income to protect the environment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motivations Trust (share) Int. Motiv.*Trust (share) Ext. Motiv.*Trust (share) Full model
Middle income 0.0586∗∗∗ (8.14) 0.0585∗∗∗ (8.14) 0.0590∗∗∗ (8.20) 0.0587∗∗∗ (8.16) 0.0590∗∗∗ (8.21)
High income 0.0960∗∗∗ (10.81) 0.0959∗∗∗ (10.80) 0.0963∗∗∗ (10.85) 0.0960∗∗∗ (10.81) 0.0964∗∗∗ (10.85)
Secondary education 0.0725∗∗∗ (9.75) 0.0725∗∗∗ (9.75) 0.0723∗∗∗ (9.73) 0.0724∗∗∗ (9.74) 0.0723∗∗∗ (9.72)
Tertiary education or higher 0.169∗∗∗ (18.24) 0.169∗∗∗ (18.24) 0.169∗∗∗ (18.17) 0.169∗∗∗ (18.19) 0.168∗∗∗ (18.14)
Married -0.00284 (-0.25) -0.00288 (-0.25) -0.00298 (-0.26) -0.00302 (-0.26) -0.00307 (-0.27)
Living together as married 0.0152 (1.05) 0.0151 (1.05) 0.0146 (1.01) 0.0151 (1.04) 0.0146 (1.01)
Divorced -0.0136 (-0.70) -0.0137 (-0.70) -0.0132 (-0.68) -0.0138 (-0.71) -0.0133 (-0.68)
Separated -0.0191 (-0.82) -0.0191 (-0.82) -0.0187 (-0.80) -0.0192 (-0.82) -0.0189 (-0.81)
Widowed -0.0922∗∗∗ (-5.13) -0.0922∗∗∗ (-5.13) -0.0921∗∗∗ (-5.12) -0.0923∗∗∗ (-5.13) -0.0922∗∗∗ (-5.13)
1 child 0.00547 (0.47) 0.00546 (0.47) 0.00548 (0.47) 0.00565 (0.48) 0.00560 (0.48)
2 children 0.0107 (0.92) 0.0107 (0.92) 0.0106 (0.91) 0.0108 (0.93) 0.0106 (0.91)
3 children -0.0120 (-0.92) -0.0120 (-0.92) -0.0120 (-0.92) -0.0119 (-0.91) -0.0119 (-0.91)
4 children -0.0132 (-0.85) -0.0132 (-0.85) -0.0134 (-0.86) -0.0132 (-0.85) -0.0134 (-0.86)
5 children -0.0240 (-1.23) -0.0240 (-1.23) -0.0242 (-1.24) -0.0241 (-1.23) -0.0242 (-1.24)
6 children 0.00265 (0.11) 0.00271 (0.11) 0.00220 (0.09) 0.00239 (0.10) 0.00203 (0.08)
7 children -0.00900 (-0.29) -0.00891 (-0.28) -0.00984 (-0.31) -0.00929 (-0.30) -0.0100 (-0.32)
8 children or more -0.0203 (-0.82) -0.0204 (-0.82) -0.0208 (-0.83) -0.0204 (-0.82) -0.0207 (-0.83)
Part-time 0.0316∗∗ (2.62) 0.0316∗∗ (2.62) 0.0309∗ (2.56) 0.0316∗∗ (2.62) 0.0309∗ (2.56)
Self-employed 0.0357∗∗∗ (3.51) 0.0357∗∗∗ (3.51) 0.0354∗∗∗ (3.49) 0.0358∗∗∗ (3.52) 0.0355∗∗∗ (3.49)
Retired -0.0351∗∗ (-2.63) -0.0351∗∗ (-2.62) -0.0350∗∗ (-2.62) -0.0351∗∗ (-2.62) -0.0351∗∗ (-2.62)
Housewife -0.00122 (-0.11) -0.00112 (-0.10) -0.00144 (-0.13) -0.00123 (-0.11) -0.00149 (-0.14)
Student 0.0680∗∗∗ (5.01) 0.0680∗∗∗ (5.01) 0.0675∗∗∗ (4.97) 0.0681∗∗∗ (5.02) 0.0676∗∗∗ (4.98)
Unemployed -0.00273 (-0.25) -0.00270 (-0.24) -0.00299 (-0.27) -0.00279 (-0.25) -0.00304 (-0.27)
Other -0.0196 (-0.95) -0.0198 (-0.96) -0.0196 (-0.95) -0.0200 (-0.97) -0.0197 (-0.96)
Female 0.00204 (0.32) 0.00203 (0.32) 0.00174 (0.27) 0.00201 (0.31) 0.00174 (0.27)
Age -0.00185 (-1.48) -0.00186 (-1.48) -0.00191 (-1.52) -0.00187 (-1.49) -0.00191 (-1.52)
Age squared/100 0.00326∗ (2.41) 0.00326∗ (2.41) 0.00331∗ (2.45) 0.00327∗ (2.42) 0.00331∗ (2.45)
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ (log) -0.0230 (-0.51) -0.0284 (-0.63) -0.0290 (-0.64) -0.0285 (-0.63) -0.0290 (-0.64)
Human capital index -0.227∗∗ (-2.81) -0.243∗∗ (-2.98) -0.242∗∗ (-2.96) -0.243∗∗ (-2.97) -0.242∗∗ (-2.96)
Share of people trusting others 0.200 (1.02) 0.165 (0.84) 0.226 (1.15) 0.184 (0.93)
Intrinsically motivated 0.141∗∗∗ (13.62) 0.141∗∗∗ (13.61) 0.0689∗∗∗ (3.42) 0.0728∗∗∗ (3.58)
Intrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) 0.226∗∗∗ (4.18) 0.140∗∗∗ (13.48) 0.211∗∗∗ (3.84)
Extrinsically motivated -0.149∗∗∗ (-23.30) -0.149∗∗∗ (-23.29) -0.150∗∗∗ (-23.47) -0.127∗∗∗ (-10.48) -0.136∗∗∗ (-11.02)
Extrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) -0.0935∗ (-2.16) -0.0610 (-1.38)
Constant 3.524∗∗∗ (12.89) 3.565∗∗∗ (12.95) 3.579∗∗∗ (12.97) 3.560∗∗∗ (12.91) 3.575∗∗∗ (12.94)
lns1 1 1 -1.654∗∗∗ (-11.06) -1.650∗∗∗ (-11.19) -1.649∗∗∗ (-11.18) -1.649∗∗∗ (-11.18) -1.648∗∗∗ (-11.18)
lns2 1 1 -2.096∗∗∗ (-9.94) -2.121∗∗∗ (-9.90) -2.119∗∗∗ (-9.90) -2.119∗∗∗ (-9.90) -2.117∗∗∗ (-9.90)
lnsig e -0.247∗∗∗ (-94.76) -0.247∗∗∗ (-94.76) -0.247∗∗∗ (-94.80) -0.247∗∗∗ (-94.77) -0.247∗∗∗ (-94.81)
Observations 73847 73847 73847 73847 73847
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 12: Results from multilevel regression model. The dependent variable
is people’s willingness to pay higher taxes to protect the environment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motivations Trust (share) Int. Motiv.*Trust (share) Ext. Motiv.*Trust (share) Full model
Middle income 0.0489∗∗∗ (8.25) 0.0489∗∗∗ (8.24) 0.0495∗∗∗ (8.34) 0.0492∗∗∗ (8.29) 0.0497∗∗∗ (8.37)
High income 0.0910∗∗∗ (12.53) 0.0909∗∗∗ (12.51) 0.0915∗∗∗ (12.59) 0.0912∗∗∗ (12.55) 0.0916∗∗∗ (12.62)
Secondary education 0.0679∗∗∗ (11.02) 0.0679∗∗∗ (11.02) 0.0677∗∗∗ (10.99) 0.0676∗∗∗ (10.98) 0.0675∗∗∗ (10.97)
Tertiary education or higher 0.140∗∗∗ (18.39) 0.140∗∗∗ (18.39) 0.140∗∗∗ (18.31) 0.140∗∗∗ (18.29) 0.139∗∗∗ (18.24)
Married 0.00429 (0.46) 0.00420 (0.45) 0.00391 (0.42) 0.00405 (0.43) 0.00383 (0.41)
Living together as married 0.00483 (0.40) 0.00464 (0.39) 0.00394 (0.33) 0.00452 (0.38) 0.00393 (0.33)
Divorced -0.0232 (-1.50) -0.0234 (-1.51) -0.0230 (-1.49) -0.0234 (-1.51) -0.0231 (-1.49)
Separated -0.0157 (-0.83) -0.0157 (-0.82) -0.0159 (-0.84) -0.0160 (-0.84) -0.0161 (-0.85)
Widowed -0.0695∗∗∗ (-4.77) -0.0695∗∗∗ (-4.77) -0.0696∗∗∗ (-4.77) -0.0695∗∗∗ (-4.77) -0.0696∗∗∗ (-4.78)
1 child 0.0107 (1.14) 0.0107 (1.14) 0.0109 (1.16) 0.0111 (1.18) 0.0111 (1.18)
2 children 0.00678 (0.73) 0.00680 (0.73) 0.00678 (0.73) 0.00691 (0.75) 0.00686 (0.74)
3 children -0.00129 (-0.12) -0.00128 (-0.12) -0.00116 (-0.11) -0.00120 (-0.11) -0.00112 (-0.11)
4 children -0.0226 (-1.79) -0.0225 (-1.79) -0.0227 (-1.80) -0.0226 (-1.79) -0.0227 (-1.80)
5 children -0.0194 (-1.22) -0.0193 (-1.21) -0.0196 (-1.23) -0.0196 (-1.23) -0.0198 (-1.24)
6 children -0.0492∗ (-2.44) -0.0491∗ (-2.43) -0.0495∗ (-2.45) -0.0494∗ (-2.45) -0.0497∗ (-2.46)
7 children -0.0286 (-1.09) -0.0284 (-1.08) -0.0292 (-1.12) -0.0289 (-1.10) -0.0295 (-1.13)
8 children or more -0.0197 (-0.91) -0.0196 (-0.90) -0.0205 (-0.95) -0.0199 (-0.92) -0.0207 (-0.95)
Part-time 0.0243∗ (2.51) 0.0242∗ (2.50) 0.0232∗ (2.40) 0.0243∗ (2.51) 0.0234∗ (2.41)
Self-employed -0.00423 (-0.50) -0.00412 (-0.48) -0.00444 (-0.52) -0.00407 (-0.48) -0.00437 (-0.51)
Retired -0.0324∗∗ (-3.01) -0.0323∗∗ (-3.00) -0.0324∗∗ (-3.01) -0.0324∗∗ (-3.01) -0.0325∗∗ (-3.01)
Housewife -0.0270∗∗ (-3.01) -0.0268∗∗ (-2.99) -0.0272∗∗ (-3.03) -0.0270∗∗ (-3.01) -0.0273∗∗ (-3.04)
Student 0.0474∗∗∗ (4.17) 0.0474∗∗∗ (4.17) 0.0469∗∗∗ (4.13) 0.0476∗∗∗ (4.19) 0.0471∗∗∗ (4.15)
Unemployed 0.00210 (0.22) 0.00219 (0.23) 0.00172 (0.18) 0.00217 (0.23) 0.00176 (0.19)
Other -0.0343∗ (-1.97) -0.0345∗ (-1.98) -0.0345∗ (-1.98) -0.0350∗ (-2.01) -0.0348∗ (-2.00)
Female 0.0147∗∗ (2.79) 0.0147∗∗ (2.78) 0.0143∗∗ (2.70) 0.0146∗∗ (2.76) 0.0142∗∗ (2.69)
Age -0.00197 (-1.88) -0.00197 (-1.88) -0.00200 (-1.92) -0.00197 (-1.89) -0.00201 (-1.92)
Age squared/100 0.00266∗ (2.34) 0.00265∗ (2.34) 0.00269∗ (2.37) 0.00266∗ (2.35) 0.00269∗ (2.37)
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ (log) -0.0105 (-0.30) -0.0215 (-0.64) -0.0224 (-0.67) -0.0220 (-0.65) -0.0226 (-0.67)
Human capital index -0.190∗∗ (-3.21) -0.221∗∗∗ (-3.82) -0.220∗∗∗ (-3.81) -0.221∗∗∗ (-3.82) -0.220∗∗∗ (-3.81)
Share of people trusting others 0.430∗∗ (2.63) 0.385∗ (2.35) 0.476∗∗ (2.90) 0.423∗∗ (2.58)
Intrinsically motivated 0.138∗∗∗ (16.91) 0.138∗∗∗ (16.89) 0.0493∗∗ (3.06) 0.136∗∗∗ (16.66) 0.0571∗∗∗ (3.50)
Intrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) 0.285∗∗∗ (6.34) 0.256∗∗∗ (5.58)
Extrinsically motivated -0.121∗∗∗ (-22.87) -0.121∗∗∗ (-22.86) -0.123∗∗∗ (-23.10) -0.0810∗∗∗ (-7.58) -0.0928∗∗∗ (-8.53)
Extrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) -0.166∗∗∗ (-4.37) -0.122∗∗ (-3.16)
Constant 3.207∗∗∗ (14.08) 3.279∗∗∗ (14.97) 3.298∗∗∗ (15.05) 3.272∗∗∗ (14.92) 3.291∗∗∗ (15.01)
lns1 1 1 -2.135∗∗∗ (-7.32) -2.275∗∗∗ (-6.46) -2.282∗∗∗ (-6.37) -2.275∗∗∗ (-6.44) -2.281∗∗∗ (-6.37)
lns2 1 1 -1.675∗∗∗ (-15.09) -1.677∗∗∗ (-15.34) -1.674∗∗∗ (-15.32) -1.675∗∗∗ (-15.32) -1.673∗∗∗ (-15.30)
lnsig e -0.203∗∗∗ (-98.76) -0.203∗∗∗ (-98.76) -0.203∗∗∗ (-98.85) -0.203∗∗∗ (-98.80) -0.203∗∗∗ (-98.87)
Observations 118801 118801 118801 118801 118801
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: Results from multilevel regression model. The dependent variable
is people’s declaration that they do recycling.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motivations Trust (share) Int. Motiv.*Trust (share) Ext. Motiv.*Trust (share) Full model
Middle income 0.0442∗∗∗ (7.70) 0.0440∗∗∗ (7.67) 0.0437∗∗∗ (7.62) 0.0438∗∗∗ (7.64) 0.0436∗∗∗ (7.60)
High income 0.0411∗∗∗ (6.01) 0.0409∗∗∗ (5.98) 0.0406∗∗∗ (5.94) 0.0407∗∗∗ (5.95) 0.0405∗∗∗ (5.93)
Secondary education 0.0599∗∗∗ (10.28) 0.0600∗∗∗ (10.30) 0.0600∗∗∗ (10.30) 0.0601∗∗∗ (10.32) 0.0601∗∗∗ (10.32)
Tertiary education or higher 0.110∗∗∗ (15.35) 0.110∗∗∗ (15.37) 0.110∗∗∗ (15.40) 0.110∗∗∗ (15.41) 0.111∗∗∗ (15.42)
Married 0.0359∗∗∗ (4.09) 0.0358∗∗∗ (4.07) 0.0360∗∗∗ (4.10) 0.0357∗∗∗ (4.07) 0.0359∗∗∗ (4.09)
Living together as married 0.00229 (0.20) 0.00214 (0.18) 0.00228 (0.20) 0.00214 (0.18) 0.00227 (0.19)
Divorced 0.00720 (0.52) 0.00707 (0.51) 0.00713 (0.51) 0.00697 (0.50) 0.00705 (0.51)
Separated 0.0244 (1.32) 0.0244 (1.32) 0.0247 (1.34) 0.0245 (1.33) 0.0248 (1.34)
Widowed 0.0329∗ (2.45) 0.0328∗ (2.45) 0.0328∗ (2.45) 0.0328∗ (2.44) 0.0328∗ (2.45)
1 child -0.00533 (-0.62) -0.00532 (-0.61) -0.00540 (-0.62) -0.00541 (-0.63) -0.00546 (-0.63)
2 children -0.00882 (-1.06) -0.00881 (-1.06) -0.00890 (-1.07) -0.00888 (-1.07) -0.00894 (-1.07)
3 children -0.0103 (-1.09) -0.0103 (-1.09) -0.0104 (-1.10) -0.0103 (-1.09) -0.0104 (-1.10)
4 children -0.00954 (-0.83) -0.00947 (-0.83) -0.00953 (-0.83) -0.00953 (-0.83) -0.00956 (-0.84)
5 children -0.0380∗ (-2.56) -0.0379∗ (-2.55) -0.0379∗ (-2.55) -0.0379∗ (-2.56) -0.0379∗ (-2.56)
6 children -0.0429∗ (-2.14) -0.0427∗ (-2.14) -0.0427∗ (-2.13) -0.0429∗ (-2.14) -0.0428∗ (-2.14)
7 children 0.00700 (0.26) 0.00727 (0.27) 0.00713 (0.27) 0.00727 (0.27) 0.00714 (0.27)
8 children or more -0.0465 (-1.91) -0.0462 (-1.90) -0.0457 (-1.88) -0.0460 (-1.89) -0.0456 (-1.87)
Part-time -0.00123 (-0.14) -0.00129 (-0.15) -0.00108 (-0.12) -0.00144 (-0.16) -0.00121 (-0.14)
Self-employed 0.0117 (1.39) 0.0118 (1.40) 0.0118 (1.39) 0.0118 (1.40) 0.0118 (1.39)
Retired 0.00195 (0.20) 0.00202 (0.20) 0.00192 (0.20) 0.00205 (0.21) 0.00196 (0.20)
Housewife -0.0210∗ (-2.41) -0.0207∗ (-2.38) -0.0209∗ (-2.40) -0.0207∗ (-2.38) -0.0209∗ (-2.39)
Student -0.000422 (-0.04) -0.000374 (-0.03) -0.000409 (-0.04) -0.000492 (-0.04) -0.000491 (-0.04)
Unemployed -0.0283∗∗ (-3.09) -0.0283∗∗ (-3.08) -0.0283∗∗ (-3.08) -0.0283∗∗ (-3.09) -0.0283∗∗ (-3.08)
Other -0.0276 (-1.56) -0.0274 (-1.55) -0.0273 (-1.54) -0.0273 (-1.54) -0.0272 (-1.53)
Female 0.0330∗∗∗ (6.57) 0.0330∗∗∗ (6.57) 0.0332∗∗∗ (6.61) 0.0331∗∗∗ (6.59) 0.0333∗∗∗ (6.61)
Age 0.00400∗∗∗ (3.95) 0.00401∗∗∗ (3.95) 0.00400∗∗∗ (3.94) 0.00401∗∗∗ (3.96) 0.00400∗∗∗ (3.95)
Age squared/100 -0.00402∗∗∗ (-3.65) -0.00403∗∗∗ (-3.66) -0.00402∗∗∗ (-3.65) -0.00404∗∗∗ (-3.66) -0.00403∗∗∗ (-3.65)
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ (log) 0.192∗∗∗ (4.20) 0.166∗∗∗ (4.10) 0.167∗∗∗ (4.11) 0.167∗∗∗ (4.11) 0.167∗∗∗ (4.12)
Human capital index -0.0247 (-0.36) -0.0593 (-0.99) -0.0599 (-1.00) -0.0596 (-0.99) -0.0600 (-1.00)
Share of people trusting others 0.632∗∗ (3.23) 0.648∗∗∗ (3.31) 0.618∗∗ (3.15) 0.636∗∗ (3.24)
Intrinsically motivated 0.0404∗∗∗ (5.38) 0.0403∗∗∗ (5.36) 0.0722∗∗∗ (4.09) 0.0409∗∗∗ (5.43) 0.0694∗∗∗ (3.87)
Intrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) -0.0942∗ (-2.00) -0.0844 (-1.75)
Extrinsically motivated -0.0402∗∗∗ (-7.91) -0.0402∗∗∗ (-7.90) -0.0397∗∗∗ (-7.80) -0.0549∗∗∗ (-4.58) -0.0504∗∗∗ (-4.11)
Extrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) 0.0550 (1.36) 0.0397 (0.96)
Constant -1.394∗∗∗ (-4.30) -1.249∗∗∗ (-4.37) -1.256∗∗∗ (-4.39) -1.249∗∗∗ (-4.36) -1.256∗∗∗ (-4.39)
lns1 1 1 -1.840∗∗∗ (-14.84) -1.978∗∗∗ (-15.92) -1.978∗∗∗ (-15.93) -1.978∗∗∗ (-15.92) -1.978∗∗∗ (-15.92)
lnsig e -0.843∗∗∗ (-226.44) -0.843∗∗∗ (-226.44) -0.844∗∗∗ (-226.46) -0.843∗∗∗ (-226.45) -0.844∗∗∗ (-226.46)
Observations 36071 36071 36071 36071 36071
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14: Results from multilevel regression model. The dependent variable
is people’s declaration that they do reduce water consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motivations Trust (share) Int. Motiv.*Trust (share) Ext. Motiv.*Trust (share) Full model
Middle income 0.0325∗∗∗ (5.51) 0.0325∗∗∗ (5.52) 0.0324∗∗∗ (5.50) 0.0324∗∗∗ (5.50) 0.0324∗∗∗ (5.49)
High income 0.0133 (1.88) 0.0134 (1.89) 0.0133 (1.88) 0.0133 (1.87) 0.0132 (1.87)
Secondary education 0.0580∗∗∗ (9.50) 0.0579∗∗∗ (9.49) 0.0580∗∗∗ (9.49) 0.0580∗∗∗ (9.50) 0.0580∗∗∗ (9.50)
Tertiary education or higher 0.0780∗∗∗ (10.40) 0.0780∗∗∗ (10.40) 0.0780∗∗∗ (10.40) 0.0782∗∗∗ (10.42) 0.0782∗∗∗ (10.42)
Married 0.0440∗∗∗ (4.77) 0.0441∗∗∗ (4.78) 0.0442∗∗∗ (4.78) 0.0441∗∗∗ (4.77) 0.0441∗∗∗ (4.78)
Living together as married 0.0110 (0.89) 0.0111 (0.90) 0.0111 (0.90) 0.0111 (0.90) 0.0111 (0.90)
Divorced 0.0444∗∗ (3.11) 0.0445∗∗ (3.12) 0.0445∗∗ (3.12) 0.0444∗∗ (3.11) 0.0444∗∗ (3.11)
Separated 0.0536∗∗ (2.77) 0.0536∗∗ (2.77) 0.0537∗∗ (2.78) 0.0536∗∗ (2.77) 0.0537∗∗ (2.78)
Widowed 0.0434∗∗ (3.15) 0.0434∗∗ (3.15) 0.0434∗∗ (3.15) 0.0434∗∗ (3.15) 0.0434∗∗ (3.15)
1 child -0.00477 (-0.53) -0.00480 (-0.53) -0.00483 (-0.54) -0.00486 (-0.54) -0.00488 (-0.54)
2 children -0.0120 (-1.39) -0.0121 (-1.39) -0.0121 (-1.39) -0.0121 (-1.40) -0.0121 (-1.40)
3 children -0.0138 (-1.39) -0.0138 (-1.39) -0.0139 (-1.40) -0.0138 (-1.39) -0.0138 (-1.39)
4 children -0.0235 (-1.93) -0.0235 (-1.94) -0.0236 (-1.94) -0.0236 (-1.94) -0.0236 (-1.94)
5 children -0.0339∗ (-2.16) -0.0339∗ (-2.16) -0.0339∗ (-2.16) -0.0340∗ (-2.16) -0.0340∗ (-2.16)
6 children -0.0787∗∗∗ (-3.67) -0.0787∗∗∗ (-3.67) -0.0788∗∗∗ (-3.67) -0.0788∗∗∗ (-3.68) -0.0788∗∗∗ (-3.68)
7 children -0.0273 (-0.96) -0.0273 (-0.96) -0.0274 (-0.96) -0.0273 (-0.96) -0.0273 (-0.96)
8 children or more -0.0742∗∗ (-2.84) -0.0743∗∗ (-2.85) -0.0741∗∗ (-2.84) -0.0741∗∗ (-2.84) -0.0740∗∗ (-2.83)
Part-time 0.00146 (0.16) 0.00149 (0.16) 0.00156 (0.17) 0.00139 (0.15) 0.00146 (0.16)
Self-employed -0.000511 (-0.06) -0.000506 (-0.06) -0.000537 (-0.06) -0.000496 (-0.06) -0.000521 (-0.06)
Retired 0.0178 (1.77) 0.0178 (1.77) 0.0178 (1.77) 0.0178 (1.77) 0.0178 (1.77)
Housewife 0.000778 (0.08) 0.000742 (0.08) 0.000693 (0.08) 0.000762 (0.08) 0.000723 (0.08)
Student -0.00875 (-0.75) -0.00875 (-0.75) -0.00878 (-0.75) -0.00882 (-0.76) -0.00883 (-0.76)
Unemployed -0.0127 (-1.34) -0.0127 (-1.34) -0.0127 (-1.34) -0.0127 (-1.34) -0.0127 (-1.34)
Other -0.0444∗ (-2.54) -0.0444∗ (-2.54) -0.0444∗ (-2.54) -0.0443∗ (-2.53) -0.0443∗ (-2.53)
Female 0.0417∗∗∗ (8.04) 0.0417∗∗∗ (8.04) 0.0417∗∗∗ (8.05) 0.0417∗∗∗ (8.05) 0.0418∗∗∗ (8.06)
Age 0.00781∗∗∗ (7.45) 0.00781∗∗∗ (7.45) 0.00781∗∗∗ (7.45) 0.00781∗∗∗ (7.45) 0.00781∗∗∗ (7.45)
Age squared/100 -0.00615∗∗∗ (-5.40) -0.00614∗∗∗ (-5.40) -0.00614∗∗∗ (-5.39) -0.00615∗∗∗ (-5.40) -0.00615∗∗∗ (-5.40)
Real GDP at constant 2011 US$ (log) 0.0220 (0.57) 0.0298 (0.76) 0.0300 (0.77) 0.0301 (0.77) 0.0302 (0.77)
Human capital index -0.0164 (-0.27) -0.00571 (-0.09) -0.00590 (-0.10) -0.00588 (-0.10) -0.00600 (-0.10)
Share of people trusting others -0.194 (-0.93) -0.187 (-0.90) -0.204 (-0.98) -0.198 (-0.95)
Intrinsically motivated 0.0465∗∗∗ (5.88) 0.0465∗∗∗ (5.89) 0.0589∗∗ (3.14) 0.0470∗∗∗ (5.94) 0.0563∗∗ (2.96)
Intrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) -0.0372 (-0.73) -0.0282 (-0.54)
Extrinsically motivated -0.0550∗∗∗ (-10.52) -0.0550∗∗∗ (-10.52) -0.0548∗∗∗ (-10.48) -0.0663∗∗∗ (-5.13) -0.0648∗∗∗ (-4.90)
Extrinsically motivated=1 × Trust (share) 0.0420 (0.96) 0.0369 (0.82)
Constant 0.0581 (0.21) 0.0130 (0.05) 0.0101 (0.04) 0.0135 (0.05) 0.0112 (0.04)
lns1 1 1 -1.899∗∗∗ (-15.95) -1.911∗∗∗ (-16.05) -1.912∗∗∗ (-16.05) -1.913∗∗∗ (-16.06) -1.913∗∗∗ (-16.06)
lnsig e -0.752∗∗∗ (-213.71) -0.752∗∗∗ (-213.71) -0.752∗∗∗ (-213.72) -0.752∗∗∗ (-213.72) -0.752∗∗∗ (-213.72)
Observations 40464 40464 40464 40464 40464
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Motivations and pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes using
2SLS and instrumental variables. The table reports the coefficients of linear
probability models with sample weights and robust standard errors.
Pay 20% more Give part of income Pay higher taxes Recycling Reduce water consumption
first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage
Resp.’ interest 0.105∗∗∗ (7.68) 0.0814∗∗∗ (5.86) 0.0930∗∗∗ (9.14) 0.0714∗∗∗ (8.88) 0.101∗∗∗ (8.37)
Secondary education 0.0571∗∗ (2.92) 0.0988∗∗∗ (6.85) 0.0810∗∗∗ (6.66) 0.0834∗∗∗ (6.56) 0.0720∗∗∗ (4.66)
Tertiary education or higher 0.186∗∗∗ (7.55) 0.228∗∗∗ (8.92) 0.214∗∗∗ (11.62) 0.209∗∗∗ (10.10) 0.198∗∗∗ (8.38)
Part-time 0.0790∗∗ (3.03) -0.0876∗∗ (-3.12) 0.0296 (1.52) 0.0203 (0.71) 0.0486∗∗ (3.01) -0.00436 (-0.18) 0.0619∗∗∗ (3.78) -0.0280∗ (-2.38) 0.0646∗ (2.57) 0.00601 (0.23)
Self-employed 0.0211 (0.69) -0.0191 (-0.46) 0.0237 (0.97) 0.0919∗ (2.35) 0.0255 (1.33) 0.0366 (1.24) 0.0505∗ (2.26) -0.0158 (-1.11) 0.0000203 (0.00) 0.0502 (1.19)
Retired 0.0614∗∗∗ (3.72) -0.119∗∗ (-3.08) 0.00311 (0.12) -0.0506 (-1.63) 0.0262 (1.65) -0.0561∗ (-2.44) 0.0779∗∗∗ (4.19) -0.0441∗∗ (-3.05) 0.0494∗∗ (2.93) 0.0187 (0.63)
Housewife 0.0330 (1.14) 0.00521 (0.16) -0.0160 (-0.77) 0.0975∗∗ (3.08) 0.00767 (0.44) 0.0339 (1.43) 0.0372∗ (2.09) -0.0422∗ (-2.26) 0.00865 (0.33) 0.0741∗ (2.05)
Student -0.0233 (-0.71) 0.0182 (0.40) 0.0316 (1.69) 0.0415 (1.32) 0.0109 (0.64) 0.0271 (0.99) 0.0253 (1.20) -0.0164 (-1.01) -0.0212 (-0.62) 0.00667 (0.18)
Unemployed -0.0509∗ (-2.47) 0.0131 (0.35) -0.0534∗ (-2.39) 0.0751∗ (2.12) -0.0541∗∗∗ (-3.42) 0.0438 (1.72) -0.00121 (-0.06) -0.0305 (-1.79) -0.0491∗ (-2.27) 0.0166 (0.58)
Other 0.00704 (0.22) -0.00284 (-0.04) 0.00728 (0.28) 0.286∗∗ (2.80) 0.00605 (0.31) 0.186∗ (2.46) 0.0411 (1.45) -0.0626∗∗ (-3.02) -0.00814 (-0.26) -0.00863 (-0.23)
Middle income 0.0232 (1.40) 0.00981 (0.33) -0.00656 (-0.48) 0.0691∗∗ (2.87) 0.00882 (0.78) 0.0458∗ (2.16) 0.0235 (1.91) 0.0121 (0.72) 0.0203 (1.20) 0.0331 (1.63)
High income 0.0770∗∗ (2.99) -0.0226 (-0.59) 0.0525∗ (2.46) 0.0377 (1.06) 0.0653∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.0276 (0.92) 0.0789∗∗∗ (4.75) -0.00809 (-0.44) 0.0736∗∗ (2.90) -0.00668 (-0.22)
Age -0.00500∗ (-2.54) -0.00132 (-0.53) 0.000133 (0.07) -0.00519 (-1.70) -0.00141 (-1.04) -0.00314 (-1.61) -0.00289∗ (-2.11) 0.00480∗∗∗ (3.83) -0.00478∗ (-2.40) 0.00952∗∗∗ (4.29)
Age squared/100 0.00768∗∗∗ (4.11) -0.00216 (-0.72) 0.00297 (1.55) 0.00208 (0.80) 0.00426∗∗ (3.12) 0.000638 (0.34) 0.00406∗∗ (2.79) -0.00553∗∗∗ (-4.33) 0.00765∗∗∗ (3.94) -0.00969∗∗∗ (-4.15)
Female 0.0465∗∗∗ (3.90) -0.00752 (-0.46) 0.0563∗∗∗ (6.06) -0.0693∗∗∗ (-3.73) 0.0521∗∗∗ (7.07) -0.0393∗∗ (-3.18) 0.0443∗∗∗ (4.37) 0.0113 (1.40) 0.0474∗∗∗ (4.48) 0.0102 (0.98)
Married -0.0583∗∗ (-2.73) 0.0722∗∗ (3.18) -0.0280 (-1.63) 0.0547 (1.92) -0.0455∗∗∗ (-3.34) 0.0634∗∗ (3.05) -0.0440∗∗ (-2.80) 0.0486∗∗∗ (4.02) -0.0624∗∗ (-2.89) 0.0465∗∗ (2.63)
Living together as married 0.0568∗ (1.96) -0.0867 (-1.88) 0.0322 (1.12) -0.0457 (-1.09) 0.0384 (1.75) -0.0470 (-1.87) -0.0134 (-0.88) -0.00106 (-0.09) 0.0754∗∗ (2.82) -0.0231 (-0.79)
Divorced 0.00792 (0.26) -0.0782 (-1.83) 0.0331 (1.29) -0.0827∗ (-2.38) 0.0129 (0.63) -0.0448 (-1.54) -0.0245 (-1.04) 0.0102 (0.49) 0.00842 (0.26) 0.0329 (1.23)
Separated -0.00116 (-0.03) -0.0337 (-0.62) 0.0455 (1.89) -0.0523 (-1.31) 0.0304 (1.49) -0.0360 (-1.24) -0.0131 (-0.44) 0.0143 (0.54) 0.0143 (0.38) 0.0727∗∗ (2.99)
Widowed -0.0929∗∗∗ (-3.74) 0.0147 (0.46) -0.0494 (-1.85) -0.00969 (-0.29) -0.0752∗∗∗ (-3.97) 0.00228 (0.09) -0.0585∗∗ (-2.94) 0.0505∗∗∗ (3.66) -0.0831∗∗ (-3.27) 0.0541∗ (2.47)
1 child -0.0633∗∗∗ (-3.30) 0.0567∗∗ (2.58) -0.0742∗∗∗ (-6.51) 0.0596∗∗ (2.59) -0.0702∗∗∗ (-6.72) 0.0464∗∗ (2.69) -0.0430∗∗∗ (-3.40) 0.0161 (1.63) -0.0570∗∗ (-3.07) 0.0138 (0.92)
2 children -0.0578∗∗∗ (-3.62) 0.0320 (1.63) -0.0682∗∗∗ (-4.72) 0.0792∗∗ (3.19) -0.0644∗∗∗ (-6.25) 0.0572∗∗∗ (3.39) -0.0395∗∗ (-2.87) 0.0114 (1.33) -0.0503∗∗ (-3.00) 0.00255 (0.17)
3 children -0.0466∗ (-2.26) -0.00957 (-0.35) -0.0528∗∗ (-2.99) 0.0587 (1.87) -0.0466∗∗∗ (-3.37) 0.0305 (1.38) -0.0352∗ (-2.25) 0.00499 (0.40) -0.0413∗ (-1.99) 0.0119 (0.79)
4 children -0.0682∗∗ (-2.59) 0.00475 (0.11) -0.0801∗∗∗ (-3.86) 0.0909∗ (2.26) -0.0699∗∗∗ (-4.12) 0.0341 (1.05) -0.0369∗ (-2.06) 0.00749 (0.44) -0.0684∗∗ (-2.64) 0.0206 (0.95)
5 children -0.0593 (-1.94) 0.0472 (1.03) -0.0945∗∗∗ (-4.14) 0.101∗ (2.15) -0.0749∗∗∗ (-4.03) 0.0415 (1.17) 0.00156 (0.08) -0.0379 (-1.81) -0.0514 (-1.62) -0.000728 (-0.03)
6 children -0.0981∗ (-2.21) 0.137∗∗ (2.59) -0.0694∗∗ (-2.59) 0.151∗∗ (3.11) -0.0677∗∗ (-2.66) 0.0341 (0.79) -0.0388 (-1.42) -0.0143 (-0.59) -0.107∗∗ (-2.66) -0.00221 (-0.05)
7 children -0.0567 (-0.88) 0.0606 (0.76) -0.0305 (-0.91) 0.0454 (0.52) -0.0250 (-0.78) -0.000718 (-0.01) -0.0207 (-0.55) -0.00480 (-0.15) -0.0847 (-1.79) 0.0296 (0.84)
8 children or more -0.0800 (-1.46) 0.134∗ (2.36) -0.0783∗∗ (-3.25) 0.0739 (1.48) -0.0709∗∗ (-3.06) 0.0313 (0.71) -0.0417 (-1.14) -0.0300 (-0.95) -0.109∗ (-2.47) 0.0137 (0.24)
Motivations 0.867∗∗∗ (7.35) 1.063∗∗∗ (6.82) 0.930∗∗∗ (9.02) 0.524∗∗∗ (7.88) 0.372∗∗∗ (4.87)
N 48371 48371 75336 75336 126953 126953 42997 42997 47491 47491
RMSE 0.618 0.955 0.604 0.990 0.611 0.977 0.597 0.516 0.615 0.527
Hansen J statistics 3.748 1.567 3.017 3.905 2.520
p-value 0.153 0.457 0.221 0.142 0.284
Underidentification test 31.50 38.09 66.36 27.63 29.92
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification test 40.47 36.83 72.15 52.20 43.10
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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